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Abstract 
Host governments severely impact international relief operations. An openness to assistance 
can lead to the timely delivery of aid whereas a reluctance to receive assistance can have 
devastating consequences. With lives at stake and no time to lose in humanitarian crises, 
understanding the host government’s impact on the logistics performance of international 
humanitarian organisations (IHOs) is crucial. In this paper, we present an in-depth multiple- 
case study that explores this aspect. Results show that host government actions are explained 
by their dependency on IHOs and the levels of tensions between their interests (i.e., 
conflicting strategic goals). In addition, a host government’s regulatory and enforcement 
capabilities are important for ensuring that they can safeguard their interests. We derive four 
stances that host governments can adopt in regulating logistics-related activities: non-
restrictive, opportunistic, selectively accommodating and uncompromising. Each of these has 
different implications for the logistics performance of IHOs.  
 




Host governments are political actors with a major impact on the inventory management and 
transport activities of international humanitarian organisations (IHOs) (Kovacs and Spens, 
2008; Long and Wood, 1995; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2008; Menkhaus, 2010). In 
fact, “government” is by far the most frequently mentioned topic in humanitarian logistics 
research (Kunz and Reiner, 2012). While some host governments facilitate good performance 
by declaring a state of emergency and relaxing regulations, others impose barriers that 
impede performance (Long and Wood, 1995; McLachlin et al., 2009; Menkhaus, 2010; Pettit 
and Beresford, 2005; Toole and Waldman, 1997). Understanding why host governments 
display such heterogeneity in dealing with IHOs is crucial for enhancing delivery 
performance in humanitarian operations.  
 This research seeks to understand the impact of host governments on humanitarian 
logistics in complex emergencies. The World Health Organisation (WHO) defines a complex 
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emergency as a “situation with complex social, political and economic origins which involves 
the breakdown of state structures, the disputed legitimacy of host authorities, the abuse of 
human rights and possibly armed conflict, that creates humanitarian needs”. Complex 
emergencies constitute the majority of disasters worldwide and are increasingly the backdrop 
against which major natural disasters occur. They are characterised by large-scale multi-
faceted humanitarian needs that are worsened by major security issues, population 
displacement and the hindering of humanitarian assistance by political or military actors1.  
 We posit that host government actions are best explained by the strategic-level 
dynamics of their interactions with IHOs. Host governments and IHOs are governed by 
divergent institutional logics (Alford and Friedland, 1985). They inherently have conflicting 
strategic interests (i.e., tensions between interests) but, nevertheless, high interdependency 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Since tensions between interests and dependency are not 
mutually exclusive, this raises the question as to how the two interact and impact on the 
delivery performance of IHOs in day-to-day (operational level) and medium term (tactical 
level) planning and activities.  
 An in-depth multiple-case study approach is used to identify the core drivers and 
effects of host government actions on delivery performance, to establish patterns of linkages 
between them and to develop explanations for those linkages (Voss et al., 2002). The 
research logic is theory building, and we employ institutional theory to develop an initial 
understanding of the phenomenon. This approach of incorporating foundational theories in 
this type of research is highly recommended (e.g., Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007).  
 The main contributions of this research are that we develop a typology of host 
government stances in international relief operations and offer novel explanations for actions 
taken by host government relation to humanitarian logistics. We achieve “closeness to 
reality” and generate important insights into the humanitarian context by employing 
institutional theory (Kauppi, 2013; Kovacs and Spens, 2011). Consequently, this research 
also has major practical relevance for managers operating in this “high stakes” environment 
(Balcik et al., 2010).  
 
2. Research Background  
2.1 Logistics decisions and delivery performance  
Delivery performance in terms of lead-time and timeliness is a major priority in logistics, and 
it is strongly influenced by the quality of managerial decisions (Brown and Vastag, 1993; 
Gunasekaran et al., 2001; Vachon and Klassen, 2002). At the tactical and operational level, 
decisions regarding transport (including mode, the movement of aid workers, routing and 
scheduling) and inventory management (including sourcing) are important (Gunasekaran et 
al., 2001). Good delivery performance is especially crucial in a humanitarian setting given the 
high stakes associated with meeting beneficiary needs (Balcik et al., 2010). 
 
2.2 The role and impact of host governments in humanitarian logistics  
Host governments and international actors have obligations in major humanitarian crises that 
                                                          
1 https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/about-disasters/definition-of-hazard/complex-
emergencies/ Accessed on 31 July 2015. 
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are outlined in various legal frameworks (for an overview, see Haider, 2013). In a crisis, host 
governments are obligated to adequately protect and provide for the affected populations 
within their borders. If they do not fulfil this obligation, they should allow international actors 
to intervene. Host governments then become responsible for coordinating and facilitating the 
operations of international actors by implementing the relevant (inter)national regulations. 
International actors are obligated to be impartial and provide assistance solely for 
humanitarian purposes. A myriad of international actors become involved in major crises, 
often including non-governmental and private organisations, United Nations agencies, 
donors, militaries and the International Committee of the Red Cross (Balcik et al., 2010). The 
focus of this study is limited to IHOs that offer direct material assistance to affected 
populations. Other important actors, such as the military and donors, fall outside the scope of 
this research.  
 Complex emergencies occur in fragile states where governments are usually weak and 
incapable of providing an appropriate response, or are autocratic and unwilling to fulfil their 
obligations (Albala-Betrand, 2000). Put simply, state fragility relates to a host government’s 
incapacity or unwillingness to provide public goods (Ziaja, 2012). Although fragility does not 
absolve host governments of their obligations, there are provisions within legal frameworks 
for shifting responsibility from host governments to more capable and/or neutral international 
actors. Therefore, IHOs can play a pivotal role in complex emergencies, especially in areas of 
international armed conflict. Various legal frameworks apply in complex emergencies 
depending on the scale of the conflict. When there is no armed conflict, the international 
disaster response laws, rules and principles apply (as they do in natural disasters). Human 
rights law and international humanitarian law apply in civil armed conflicts and international 
armed conflicts respectively. Two issues addressed within these frameworks that directly 
affect humanitarian logistics are the sovereign consideration of declaring a state of 
emergency and the obligation to allow free passage of supplies for humanitarian assistance.  
 The declaration of a state of emergency is a necessary condition for immediate IHO 
involvement in non-armed and civil armed conflicts. When declared, IHOs can provide 
material assistance with limited bureaucracy. If a state of emergency is not declared, IHOs 
are essentially not welcome but can still intervene under non-emergency regulations. A 
consequence of this is that they likely face logistical challenges such as lengthy and 
complicated customs procedures for internationally sourced goods (Long and Wood, 1995; 
Pedraza-Martinez and Van Wassenhove, 2013; Van Wassenhove, 2006). The diversion of 
relief supplies by host governments or by other parties to the conflict can also be a problem 
(Menkhaus, 2010; Toole and Waldman, 1997). In international armed conflicts, there is no 
legal provision for government derogation based on sovereignty considerations. 
Consequently, the declaration of a state of emergency is not necessary for immediate IHO 
involvement. Security constraints then become the primary limiting factor. 
 The obligation to allow free passage of IHO supplies to affected areas varies under 
each of the legal frameworks. In unarmed conflicts, it is the host government’s sovereign 
right to forbid passage- regardless of the humanitarian situation, and IHOs need to find ways 
to persuade the host government to grant it. In civil armed conflicts, human rights law 
obligates host governments to allow free passage of supplies on the basis of the right of 
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civilians trapped in war zones to have access to life-sustaining supplies. In international 
armed conflicts, host governments are automatically obliged to allow free passage of supplies 
because there is no provision for derogation. However, the legal framework provisions 
related to armed conflict do not prevent host governments from imposing procedures that can 
slow response efforts. For example, they can hamper relief efforts by making it difficult to 
obtain travel permits to affected areas (Kovacs and Spens, 2009; Pettit and Beresford, 2005).  
 Despite the provisions made in the legal frameworks, several practical limitations are 
still faced in humanitarian logistics. First, as the International Disaster Database (EM-DAT) 
shows, the declaration of a state of emergency or a call for international assistance is rare. To 
date, the database captures only 14 complex emergencies since 1932 and just two since 2010 
(Yemen and Central African Republic, both in 2012). Second, the anarchic nature of conflict 
and/or the weakening of structures leave little room for the rule of law in weak states while in 
autocratic states, host governments can inhibit IHO activity in ways that cannot be easily 
proven to violate the law. For instance, autocratic governments may impose blockades on 
materials for humanitarian assistance citing lack of IHO impartiality. This was the case in 
2009 when the government of Sudan stopped relief activities by abruptly expelling 13 IHOs.  
  
2.3 Drivers of host government impact on logistics decisions and delivery performance 
In humanitarian logistics research, it is argued that IHOs intervene because the host 
government lacks capacity to respond to a disaster yet political interests are identified as 
primary drivers of host government actions (Balcik et al., 2010; Kunz and Reiner, 2012; 
Pettit and Beresford, 2005; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009). These views are in line 
with the some of the underlying reasons for the provisions made in the humanitarian 
assistance legal frameworks. However, the evidence is mostly anecdotal and there is no clear 
understanding of the nuances that lead to heterogeneity in host government behaviour. 
 The preceding review contains elements that are encompassed in two core branches of 
institutional theory: the three pillars of institutions and institutional logics. The choice of this 
theory, and of elements related to our inquiry, was determined in an iterative process as 
described in Section 3. Governments have a regulatory role and, when applicable, sovereign 
power to apply their jurisdiction in extraordinary situations. These (regulatory role and 
sovereign power) are embedded in the three pillars of institutions as proposed by Scott 
(2001): regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive. The regulative pillar relates to how 
governments enact their regulatory role to control behaviour of those subordinate to their 
authority; the normative aspect concerns the moral base for assessing the legitimacy of rules; 
and the cultural-cognitive aspect relates to legitimacy that stems from a shared understanding 
of the situation. This branch of institutional theory assumes there are widely accepted values 
that inform the behaviour of the various actors (Greenwood et al., 2008).   
 In reality, governments purposefully act to balance their inherent dependency on not-
for-profit organisations against the tensions between their interests (Mcloughlin, 2011; 
Najam, 2000; Young, 2000). For instance, IHOs conducting cross-border relief operations 
interfere with host government interests as borders are a highly sensitive issue in international 
relations (Bratton, 1989; Najam, 2000). Such tensions between interests have caused host 
governments to close or stall IHO programmes regardless of their dependency status in 
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certain instances (Albala-Bertrand 2000; Bratton, 1989). Although this tension does not 
significantly affect the application of the regulatory function of host governments, it does 
mean that the other two pillars are less useful when it comes to understanding the strategic 
aspect of host government actions that go beyond widely accepted values.  
 As such, the normative and cultural-cognitive aspects are inappropriate for explaining 
behaviour in complex emergencies. For the normative aspect to function, the government has 
to demonstrate commitment to doing what they are supposed to do in the right way 
(Stinchcombe, 1997). In complex emergencies, this is rarely the norm. Further, the belief that 
government regulations are often intended to hinder relief efforts has led to the rise of IHOs 
that sometimes undermine state sovereignty in their efforts to reach affected populations 
(Natsios, 1995). Regarding the cultural-cognitive aspect, a shared understanding of the 
situation between host governments and IHOs rarely exists; suspicion and mistrust prevail 
(Kunz and Reiner, 2012). The institutional logics branch of institutional theory was adopted 
because of its relevance in addressing purposeful action by host governments and for 
accommodating the divergent views of actors. Here the dependency-interests paradigm and 
the host governments’ endeavours to respond to it are also recognised (Alford and Friedland, 
1985; Thornton and Ocasio, 2008).  
 
 
Figure 1: Research framework 
 
Despite the richness of institutional theory and the multiple perspectives taken to understand 
government relations with not-for-profit institutions, research has so far paid little empirical 
attention to government – IHO relations (Mcloughlin, 2011; Moran, 2006; Najam, 2000) and 
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their implications for humanitarian logistics. In response, we address this gap using 
empirically grounded research. Furthermore, since the theory adopted in this research was 
identified through iterative data analysis, no a priori hypotheses have been made. Figure 1 
shows the framework that guides the research with an emphasis on the theory and the 
constructs that were eventually adopted. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Research setting and design 
The research design is a multiple-case study as this is the most appropriate approach for 
answering how and in what circumstances questions (Voss et al., 2002; Yin, 1994); here, the 
impact of host governments on delivery performance in humanitarian logistics is of interest. 
Furthermore, since international relief in complex emergencies constitutes a highly complex 
setting, an emphasis on the real-world context is crucial (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). 
 The research entails an embedded design with two levels of analysis. First, we focus 
on the operational and tactical level, where host government actions affecting logistics 
decisions and subsequent delivery performance are analysed. Second, we work back to the 
strategic level to draw inferences about the drivers of host government actions that impact 
humanitarian logistics at the operational and tactical level. This two-level analysis enables the 
generation of reliable and rich models (Eisenhardt, 1989b) of the underlying causes of 
observed patterns at the operational and tactical level by taking the strategic level into 
account. The research process was iterative with four rounds of analysis (Figure 2). 
 
3.2 Case selection 
The unit of analysis is a country in an ongoing complex emergency situation. Six cases were 
selected (Table 1), thereby fitting the recommended range of 4 to 10 cases for theory building 
research (Eisenhardt, 1989a). To control for multiple external factors and closely link 
delivery performance to host government actions, the cases were selected from a single focal 
IHO that has an established presence in complex emergencies.   
The IHO is a leading medical organisation that spends about three-quarters of its 
operational budget in countries affected by complex emergencies. It has Dunantist roots (i.e., 
it is rule-averse and strives for independence from host government influence in its 
operations) (Stoddard et al., 2009). As such, it could invoke behaviour that might otherwise 
be latent in host governments (Baruah, 2007; Najam, 2000) and therefore constitutes an 
extreme example in the complex emergency response landscape from which much can be 
learned (Bamberger and Pratt, 2010). 
We selected cases from countries in which the IHO had a presence of at least ten 
years in order to achieve a good understanding of the context. The identities of the focal IHO 
and the cases are not revealed because of data sensitivity. Since we sought to make general 
statements about host government behaviour, it was important to select cases that were “polar 
types” (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Miles and Huberman, 1994). However, polarity 
could not be established upfront, so we conducted a two-phase selection procedure. First, 









Table 1: List of selected cases 
 
to ensure significant variation among them. The economic state of a host country was 
measured using Gross Domestic Product (GDP) estimates from the World Bank and Trading 
Economics (tradingeconomics.com). Although GDP is only a crude measure of a country’s 
economic situation, it provides a good indication of the resources at the disposal of a 
government. Considering GDP estimates made it easier to draw inferences about incapability 
or unwillingness of host governments to provide public goods. A distinction was made 
between low GDP countries, which we defined as countries in the bottom 90 worldwide, and 
high GDP countries (the top 90). 
The State Fragility Index (SFI) (Marshall and Cole, 2008) was used as a measure of 
state fragility. The SFI ranges between 0 (not fragile) and 25 (extremely fragile). Since 
complex emergencies occur in fragile states, only countries with SFIs ranging from 16 to 25 
(highly fragile to extremely fragile) were considered (Marshall and Cole, 2011). We also 
checked for evidence of multicollinearity between the GDP value (which is used as a measure 
of economic effectiveness in the SFI score calculation) and the SFI score and found none 
(Pearson correlation value = .807, p<.01). 
In the second phase, further variation among cases was ensured by selection on the 
basis of the type and severity of the complex emergency. The British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) news country profiles (bbc.co.uk) and ConflictMap (conflictmap.org) 




3.3 Data collection 
Interviews were the primary source of data. An interview protocol with semi-structured 
questions was developed and piloted (Voss et al., 2002) with three respondents in December 
2012. It was then adjusted accordingly (Yin, 1994) before the second round of interviews in 
March 2013. All the interviews were conducted by the first author. Questions covered general 
aspects of the complex emergency and how the host government affected inventory 
management and transport-related decisions and outcomes.  
 Fifty interviews, between 6 and 11 per case, were conducted with highly 
knowledgeable and experienced respondents who (had) worked for the IHO. The second 
round of interviews was conducted during a gathering of the IHO’s logistics personnel (both 
those working in the field and at headquarters). Respondents who had first-hand knowledge 
of more than one country were interviewed more than once, with each interview focused on a 
specific case to ensure separation of country-specific information. In total there were 22 
respondents (R#1 to R#22) from various backgrounds and with 6 to 25 years (mean 13.1 
years) of work experience. This mix of respondents had diverse perspectives which reduced 
the likelihood of “convergent retrospective sensemaking” and biased recollections of events 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Time spent with a respondent ranged between 16 and 105 
minutes (mean 47.4 minutes). 
Data from seven other sources (Table 2) were used to complement and triangulate 
evidence from the interviews in order to ensure internal validity (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007; Voss et al., 2002). In addition to being used in the case selection, the nature of the 
complex emergency and GDP data were later incorporated in the analysis as they were useful 
for understanding the emergent constructs of dependency and tensions between host 
government and IHO interests.  
 
3.4 Data measures, coding and analysis 
3.4.1 Quantitative data 
Quantitative measures for each case were derived from five data sources (Table 3). Since the 
dependency of an institution tends to be measured in financial terms (Young, 2000), we 
followed the traditional approach of measuring government dependency (Oliver, 1991) by 
comparing host government funds to funding provided by the focal IHO and other external 
sources. In particular, we considered expenditure on healthcare to capture dependency on the 
medical focal IHO and other external sources involved in, or funding healthcare.   A 
limitation of this approach is that due to missing data in the WHO database, it is possible that 
the host government expenditure measure (Table 3) includes funding from external sources 
that is channelled through the host government.  
 
3.4.2 Qualitative data 
Interviews were transcribed and a qualitative content analysis conducted (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Schrier, 2014). We began by deductively coding for four types of 
information based on the theoretical framework (Figure 1). Inductive codes were developed 




Table 2: Data sources and use 
 
 
Table 3: Definition, measurement and derivation of quantitative variables/measures 
 




Table 4: Examples of a priori and emergent codes and representative quotes 
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and sample quotes derived from the data are presented in Table 4. The qualitative data were 
coded by the first author and, to ensure validity, the second author blind coded a sample of 
quotes using a coding scheme provided by the first author. The percent agreement level was 
0.94, comfortably within the highly acceptable range (0.9 – 1.0) (Neuendorf, 2002). This 
simple measure was used as an alternative to traditional reliability measures since these do 
not cater for a situation in which a concept is represented by multiple codes in qualitative 
content analysis (Scott et al., 2012). Further, the third author verified the coding and scoring 
undertaken by the first two authors. 
The coding and analysis of data were conducted in two stages. First, in order to 
determine host government impact on delivery performance at the operational and tactical 
level, interview data were coded and analysed for: (i) host government actions related to 
regulations and acts of sovereignty (i.e. policies, procedures, rules and laws) that impact upon 
delivery performance; and (ii) related logistics decisions and delivery performance for 
inventory management and transport (first-order analysis). Thereafter, we established links 
between (i) host government actions and (ii) logistics decisions and delivery performance 
through an iterative process (second-order analysis).  
 In the second stage, open coding was used to obtain an initial impression of the 
dynamics of host government – IHO interactions at the strategic level. This was then refined 
based on the identified relevant constructs of dependency and tension between interests (first-
order analysis). In the second-order analysis, the focus was on how the interaction between 
dependency and interests influenced host government actions. Since other unforeseen 
relevant institutional aspects could not be ruled out, the coding was open to further 
refinement and extension of key factors. This led to two important additions. First, in 
triangulating the financial and interview data, it emerged that extensive external funding 
relative to host government expenditure dampened host government dependency, and so we 
refined host government dependency accordingly. Second, we found and incorporated that a 
host government is able to guard its interests when tensions arise if it has sufficient regulation 
and enforcement capabilities, an aspect recognised in institutional theory (Giddens, 1984; 
Scott, 2001). 
 Next, a within-case analysis was conducted in order to identify unique case patterns 
followed by a cross-case analysis to mitigate the risks of exaggerating meaning, improve 
groundedness and enhance the generalisability of the findings (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994; Voss et al., 2002). 
 
4. Results and analysis 
Table 5 shows the delivery performance results derived from the focal IHO’s sourcing data. 
A negative timeliness value indicates that deliveries arrived before the requested delivery 
date while positive values reflect delays. Triangulation of the interview data with delivery 







4.1 Within case analyses  
4.1.1 Country U  
At the operational level, Country U had an average lead-time of 98.6 days and a timeliness 
rate of 49.5%. The host government did not impose any extraordinary regulations or invoke 
sovereign considerations that would impact on logistics decisions. However, it emerged that 
delivery performance was heavily influenced by corrupt practices (R#6, R#16, R#17). 
Physical capacity and infrastructure constraints were also reported to play a significant role 
(R#3, R#6, R#19).  
 At the strategic level, the host government received substantial institutional funding 
from external sources who contributed 46.1% towards the country’s healthcare budget 
(including 1.2% from the focal IHO). The host government’s contribution was about 5.6% of 
the total budget. The remaining 48.3% was raised in-country through various means 
including private funds and insurance (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 5: Delivery performance by case  
 
It emerged from the interviews that the large number of external sources meant that the host 
government was less dependent on individual funding sources, i.e., the spread had a 
dampening effect on dependency. With multiple funding options, the host government had 
little incentive to facilitate a good delivery performance for individual IHOs. The level of 
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tension between interests was generally perceived as low even though its existence was not 
ruled out. It could have been that the government’s need to deal with multiple armed forces 
was a higher priority than its relationships with IHOs or, as some respondents put it, the host 
government “don’t care” about the work of IHOs (R#3, R#6, R#16, R#17, R#19). The 
relatively low level of dependency coupled with a low tension between interests resulted in 
the host government being indifferent towards IHO activities. As a result, opportunism and 
the lack of timely action by government officials were key challenges. 
“The government is very corrupt. People are only interested in money, and not what happens 
really on the ground. (...). I don't know how our relation really is but, as I see it, we are there 
to try to reach those most in need... There are very few people [within the government] who 
are really interested in the wellbeing of the population (...).” (R#6)  
Country U’s low dependency, despite its low GDP and extreme fragility, was surprising. 
Nevertheless, despite the virtual absence of restrictive regulations, the actions of host 
government officials still caused uncertainty that affected logistics decisions and outcomes.  
 
4.1.2 Country V 
In country V, the average lead-time was 77.1 days and the timeliness rate was 83.6%. The 
host government neither imposed exceptional regulations nor exercised its sovereign powers 
and, as such, did not affect the IHO’s logistics decisions and delivery performance. Financial 
and interview data revealed that, at the strategic level, the host government was highly 
dependent on the focal IHO. 
“They try to play a strong state, but they aren't [one] because they don’t have infrastructure, 
and they know that without [the focal IHO] they can’t do anything. We are not a drop in the 
ocean, we are a serious player.” (R#15) 
Although there was no evidence of tensions between interests, some respondents argued that 
it could be latent because of the host government’s high dependency and limited regulation 
and enforcement capabilities. The level of dependency was high with about 27.5% of the total 
healthcare budget coming from external institutional sources (including 4.3% from the focal 
IHO). The host government’s own contribution was approximately 14.2% of the total budget 
and the remaining 58.3% was raised through various in-country sources. For a country with 
an extremely low GDP, these figures imply serious gaps in healthcare funding.  
 Given the high level of dependency coupled with very low or latent tensions between 
interests, the host government did not restrict the IHO’s logistics activities. The focal IHO 
freely made decisions; leading to good delivery performance. 
“Compared to my previous missions (...), country V is a paradise (...). I have never been in a 
country like that where almost all my requests for customs [clearance] are agreed. I have all 
my tax exemptions.” (R#13) 
 
4.1.3 Country W 
In country W, the average lead-time was 117 days and the timeliness rate was 42%. The host 
government imposed significant limitations on logistics. The IHO’s decision space was 
limited in terms of annual order quantities, order cycle times and frequency of travel to 
affected areas. Approval times were long and unpredictable. The quantity restrictions 
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appeared to be imposed as a way of reducing the scale of the focal IHO’s operations. 
Transportation of supplies was not highly regulated but a request for travel by individuals to 
controlled areas had to be made five weeks in advance with no guarantee that the request 
would be granted.  
 At the strategic level, there was a low level of host government dependency. The host 
government was the largest institutional spender on healthcare, contributing about 10.9% of 
the total budget with 77.5% coming from in-country sources. The focal IHO contributed 
3.5% towards the total budget whereas other external sources contributed an additional 8.1%. 
Tensions between interests were high, mainly because the focal IHO served a population 
group that the host government “systematically oppressed” (R#5). IHO presence was 
believed to be mostly due to the host government’s lack of “political will” to serve the group.  
“What we are trying to cover is not about lack of boxes of drugs (...). If there was a political 
will, we don't need to be there (...). It's a rich country; they have enough resources, including 
the most important resources... capable, skilled manpower.” (R#5)  
The low level of host government dependency coupled with the high tension between 
interests translated into an uncompromising stance in regulating humanitarian logistics. 
Regulations were imposed without explanation, and there was limited room for negotiation. 
 
4.1.4 Country X 
The average lead-time in country X was 109 days and the timeliness was 32%. The host 
government severely limited the decision space of the focal IHO. Key challenges were in 
terms of limited supplier selection options, stringent paperwork requirements and the 
requirement to supply drugs with a near-maximum shelf-life. Transport activities in 
insurgency areas were also controlled with respect to routing options. As part of the customs 
pre-clearance procedures, supplies to be brought into the country were supposed to be 
purchased before they could be approved. Sometimes, purchased products were rejected 
resulting in serious delays.  
 At the strategic level, the host government contributed 4.2% towards the host 
country’s total healthcare budget. About 47.2% came from external sources (including 0.5% 
from the focal IHO). The diverse sources of external funding had a dampening effect on host 
government dependency.  The host government dictated the rules of engagement.  
“Country X has the reputation that it’s quite a complex environment to work in, partially as a 
result of the government (...) being a strong, or ever stronger, state.” (R#4)  
The tensions between interests were high. The major issues that emerged were the 
misalignment between quality schemes and the occasional control of access to insurgency 
areas. The low level of host government dependency coupled with high tension between 
interests translated into an uncompromising stance in regulating humanitarian logistics.  
 
4.1.5 Country Y 
Country Y had an average lead-time of 112 days and a timeliness rate of 59%. Two 
regulations limited the decision space of the focal IHO. First, internationally sourced supplies 
had to be purchased before a customs pre-clearance request could be made. Second, there was 
a requirement to obtain local vendor approval for internationally sourced supplies. Although 
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this contributed to long lead-times, the focal IHO still opted for international sourcing 
because of quality concerns.  
“So can you imagine? You are running a business in [this] country and I come to you, you 
have this stuff in your shop and I say, well actually it's nothing, quality-wise it's nothing. But 
please sign here a statement that says that you don't object that I go and get it somewhere 
else because the authorities need it, otherwise I cannot import.” (R#2) 
At the strategic level, the interview, GDP, and BBC news data strongly suggested that 
country Y is highly dependent on external funding. Considerable tensions between interests 
were evident regarding medical treatment protocols and local purchasing. The high level of 
host government dependency coupled with these high tensions translated into a selectively 
facilitative stance in regulating humanitarian logistics. For instance, the host government was 
unwilling to compromise on medical protocols, but would allow international sourcing if the 
IHO obtained local vendor approval. It was initially surprising that the country was able to 
regulate logistics activities despite its major financial crisis. However, upon reflection, it 
emerged that the country had developed low cost monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
through random checks of shipments, imposing high penalties for failure to follow the 
regulations and by requiring IHOs to seek approval from local vendors.  
 
4.1.6 Country Z 
In country Z, the average lead-time was 164 days and timeliness was 42%. . Lead-times were 
severely impacted by stringent paperwork requirements for internationally sourced supplies 
and the banning of supplies from certain major manufacturers. Transport activities were 
heavily regulated in insurgency areas, limiting the focal IHO’s routing options and transport 
frequency. The focal IHO sometimes had no physical access to certain areas for months on 
end. Occasionally, the host government exercised its sovereign powers and ordered the focal 
IHO to indefinitely cease activities.  
            At the strategic level, the host government had a low dependency on external sources 
of funding. Its expenditure on healthcare relative to the total budget was by far the highest 
compared to other institutional sources at 25.8%. External sources contributed 5.7 % toward 
the budget (including 0.1% from the focal IHO). The remaining 68.5% came from in-country 
sources (Table 3). The tensions between interests were high, notably regarding operating in 
insurgency areas and sourcing from certain manufacturers. The host government’s low 
dependency coupled with the high tension between interests resulted in an uncompromising 
stance in regulating humanitarian logistics.  
 “We are a small fish. We can't even change the regulations!” (R#12)  
4.2 Cross-case analysis 
Table 6 summarises the main findings for each of the six cases. An initial cross-case 
comparison revealed that tensions between interests only affect humanitarian logistics if a 
host government has regulatory and enforcement capabilities to influence outcomes. 
However, in the two cases where the host governments did not have high capabilities 
(countries U and V), the respondents commented that it was difficult to conclusively attribute 
the relative absence of restrictions to low tensions. If regulatory and enforcement capabilities 





Table 6: Summary of findings 
 
activity and any existing tensions may consequently become latent. Further, when tensions 
between interests are low, the host government’s desire to strictly monitor and control IHO 
activity is likely to be low, even if it has good regulatory and enforcement capabilities. Thus, 
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distinct from the high tension – high capabilities combination, the overall implications for the 
other three combinations (high/low, low/high and low/low tension/capabilities) are the same.  
            Based on the above reasoning, in Figure 3, we combine the tensions between interests 
dimension with the regulation and enforcement capabilities dimension, and juxtapose this 
new dimension against dependency. This leads to four broad categories of predominant 
stances that host governments can assume which we label as non-restrictive, opportunistic, 
selectively accommodating and uncompromising. 
 
4.2.1 Non-restrictive host governments 
A distinguishing feature of the one case in this category (country V) is the amount of freedom 
the focal IHO had in decision-making. All decisions crucial for delivery performance are at 
the IHO’s discretion. Recognising that a host government’s lack of restraint could be because 
it lacks the capabilities to control IHO activities (see Olson, 2006) or because it welcomes 
IHO involvement (see Bratton, 1989), our characterisation of the host government as non-
restrictive includes both these scenarios. This finding leads to our first proposition: 
Proposition 1: Non-restrictive host governments exert little influence on humanitarian 
logistics activities, thereby paving the way for good decisions and delivery performance. 
 
 
Figure 3: Host government responses to humanitarian logistics and performance implications 
 
4.2.2 Opportunistic host governments 
Only Country U fell into this category. Although the country has some regulations, these 
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have not negatively impacted delivery performance. The challenges the IHO faces are largely 
attributed to the government authorities’ indifferent attitude. Their actions can go either way, 
and this generates uncertainty. For instance, the lack of customs regulations can lead to fast 
clearance times, but the latter was sometimes hampered by officials seeking bribes or being 
absent from work. Nevertheless, as argued earlier, the host government would be severely 
constrained by its limited regulatory and enforcement capabilities even if it desired control to 
address tensions in interests. In either case, host governments, or at least their representatives, 
can resort to opportunistic behaviour by seizing opportunities to their own advantage. This 
causes uncertainty for IHOs.  
Proposition 2: Opportunistic host governments take random actions that hamper decision-
making and performance in humanitarian logistics.  
 
4.2.3 Selectively accommodating host governments 
Country Y stood out from the other low GDP cases because it had a clear desire and ability to 
control IHO logistical activities. It is “a very sophisticated bureaucracy” with many 
regulations in place (R#14). However, despite clear tensions between interests over several 
issues, the host government was relatively accommodating on logistical issues. 
Proposition 3: Host governments that are selectively accommodating  limit IHO logistics 
decision options to an extent, thereby partially affecting outcomes and delivery performance. 
 
4.2.4 Uncompromising host governments   
All the high GDP countries (W, X, and Z) fell into this category. There is some variation in 
the specific regulations imposed by each host government, but they share a generally 
uncompromising stance regarding regulations. Negotiations with authorities often fail. In 
these countries, longer processing times are experienced because of unusual requirements that 
are unique to the settings. However, the duration of these processes is largely predictable. 
Uncertainty mostly relates to the control of movement. Not knowing when a transport ban 
will be lifted or if one will be imposed creates challenges in making inventory management 
decisions about when to replenish and how much inventory to keep in areas where access is 
limited.  
Proposition 4: Uncompromising host governments severely limit the logistics decision space 
of IHOs, and this has a major impact on delivery performance.  
 
5. Discussion 
5.1 Key research insights 
The most significant insights from our research relate to the strategic level dynamics that 
inform host government actions. Tensions between host government and IHO interests create 
a desire for control in host governments. Host governments can then use regulations and acts 
of sovereignty and this affects delivery performance in humanitarian logistics. However, 
enforcement capabilities are essential for their successful enactment.  
If a host government is not overly dependent on an IHO and there are strong tensions 
between their interests coupled with regulation/decree enforcement capabilities, it adopts a 
generally uncompromising stance. If such tensions and enforcement capabilities exist but the 
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host government is dependent on IHO involvement then it is likely to adopt a selectively 
accommodating stance. In this scenario, host governments are open to compromise on certain 
issues affecting delivery performance. Where there are low tensions between interests, or 
they remain latent due to limited regulatory and enforcement capabilities, host governments 
tend to be opportunistic if their dependency is low or adopt a non-restrictive stance if their 
dependency is high.  
 Two additional insights are worth discussing. First, the availability of financial 
resources is not a prerequisite for host government control. We found host governments that 
had developed subtle ways of regulating humanitarian logistics without using significant 
financial resources. For example, random checks and high penalties for non-compliance are 
common, relatively low-cost, tactics employed by institutions (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999). 
Second, although political motives are widely cited as the reason for host governments 
imposing tight regulations (Balcik et al., 2010; Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Pettit and Beresford, 
2005; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009), we found substantial evidence of genuine 
reform leading to tight regulations. For example, several respondents mentioned that host 
governments receiving in-kind assistance for healthcare increasingly impose stringent quality 
control measures in response to the massive influx of counterfeit medicines in developing 
countries (Fernandez et al., 2008). This perhaps partially explains why the bulk of regulatory 
challenges in inventory management relate to international sourcing.  
5.2 Implications for research and practice 
As reflected in the four stances towards IHO logistics activities derived in this paper, the 
actions by host governments in complex emergencies are more systematic and foreseeable 
than previously assumed. Our study shows that host governments have a negative impact on 
delivery performance through either limiting the decision space of IHOs or by deflecting 
expected outcomes once decisions have been made. The former has a largely deterministic 
character whereas the latter generates uncertainty. Understanding the distinction between the 
two modes of impact is important in developing appropriate response strategies.  
 We also contribute to the ongoing debate in the economic development and political 
science research fields about governmental strategic responses to activities by international 
humanitarian and other non-governmental organisations (Najam, 2000; Young, 2000). Our 
empirically grounded findings can add value to these fields where the research has been 
largely conceptual or anecdotal (Mcloughlin, 2011). Furthermore, the way we have adopted 
institutional theory validates the pressing need to integrate different branches of the theory to 
enhance its explanatory power (Hall and Taylor, 1996) thereby boosting its ability to explain 
complex phenomena.  
 In terms of practice, although our findings for IHO logistics relate to complex 
emergency situations, they may also apply to other disaster settings since host government 
considerations about tension and dependency are ever present. Furthermore, they could apply 
in the broader relief context. If a host government is uncompromising on logistics, it will 
probably also be uncompromising when it comes to regulations and decrees concerning IHO 
registration, visa procedures, policies and so forth. Turning to humanitarian logistics, 
operational and tactical decisions should be tailored to the host government’s stance. We now 
offer recommendations for each of the four stances.  
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 When facing non-restrictive host governments, practitioners can focus on best 
practice as decisions and outcomes will not be influenced by the host government. 
Effectiveness and efficiency can be achieved by, for example, carefully selecting distribution 
channels, modes and frequency of transport, minimising buffer stocks, and adopting just-in-
time delivery strategies. However, with opportunistic host governments, it is important to 
take account of practices that cause uncertainty and thus affect timeliness. Just-in-time 
approaches are unlikely to work and it is advisable to create buffers in anticipation of random 
impacts. At the strategic level, a potential solution is to form alliances among international 
actors to reduce the impact of random encounters on delivery performance, e.g., by lending 
supplies to those whose goods are held up at customs.  
 In countries with a selectively accommodating host government, it is advisable to 
seek maximum gain by making the best possible decisions for those matters fully at the 
discretion of the IHO. Wherever possible, practitioners should base decisions on the options 
that are available to them in matters where the host government is uncompromising, and 
reserve negotiations for matters of paramount importance. With such governments, there is 
potential to influence certain host government choices at the strategic level because of the 
government’s high dependency levels.  
 Most regulations imposed by uncompromising host governments result in longer lead-
times but a reasonable level of certainty can be achieved if compliance is prioritised by 
practitioners. This implies the need for advance planning on both inventory management and 
transport. Investing resources in becoming aware of, and compliant with, host government 
regulations is worthwhile as this will reduce uncertainty. At the strategic level, developing 
ways to minimise the impact of actions that generate uncertainty is probably the best 
approach. For instance, if host governments restrict IHO access to certain areas, establishing 
close partnerships with local organisations and building their capacity to respond can be an 
appropriate strategy. However, care should be taken, especially in relation to preserving the 
humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence.  
 We also caution that IHOs should be aware that the predominant stance of a host 
government depends on the general level of tensions between interests and its dependency on 
IHOs. However, different IHO mandates and resources could lead to different outcomes 
where regulations are applied on a case-by-case basis. For instance, an uncompromising host 
government may issue more travel permits to IHOs with whom the tensions are lower while 
applying the same customs regulations to all IHOs. Therefore, an IHO should understand 
how the host government perceives it specifically, and how it perceives IHOs in general, in 
order to improve the quality of its decisions. 
 
6. Conclusions, research limitations and future research 
By focusing on IHO-led relief operations in complex emergency settings, we have unravelled 
the underlying complexities that inform host government actions and their impact on 
humanitarian logistics. We derived four main host government stances from six cases, 
namely: non-restrictive, opportunistic, selectively accommodating and uncompromising 
(Figure 3) and developed four key propositions based on these stances that can be tested and 
verified in future research.  
 21 
 
            In developing the propositions, the underlying logic was that restrictive behaviour is 
most likely if tensions are high and a government has the necessary regulation and 
enforcement capabilities. This premise was corroborated by all our six cases although one 
should note that only two (countries U and V) had other than this high tension – high 
capabilities combination. Given that interviewees found it difficult to attribute the less 
restrictive behaviour in these two cases to either low tension and/or low capabilities we 
combined these variables. Since we combined these variables on the basis of two cases, this 
is a limitation of this research. It would be worthwhile to conduct further empirical research 
into the extent to which high capabilities are relevant when tension and dependency are low. 
Admittedly, such a combination will be rare in complex emergencies since it reflects stable 
conditions where IHO involvement is unwarranted. If this situation exists, our typology 
suggests that it is opportunism (perhaps in the sense that the host government has shifted 
obligations that they are able to fulfil to IHOs). However, it may happen that governments 
take an uncompromising stance with IHOs that choose to intervene instead. Future research 
could try to identify such cases and explore whether this could lead to the refinement or 
alteration of the proposed stances. 
 There are two other limitations that lead us to suggest further lines of inquiry for 
future research. First, although we were able to measure performance impact precisely in 
terms of lead-times and timeliness, we were not able to pin-point exactly the actions that have 
the most impact and the extent of that impact. Future research could employ more rigorous 
quantitative methods to establish the real extent to which identified host government actions 
impact on delivery performance. Second, although we were able to draw valuable insights by 
focusing on a Dunantist IHO, the decision to focus on a single IHO was also partly driven by 
the problems in accessing IHOs (Ehrenreich and Elliott, 2004). We expect that this does not 
fundamentally alter our proposed host government stances but it might be worthwhile to 
establish if faith-based/religious IHOs or Wilsonian IHOs (i.e., those that have an inclination 
to work in close partnership with host governments) (Stoddard et al., 2009) perform better/ 
worse than Dunantist IHOs when dealing with governments who adopt each of the identified 
stances. Establishing the role of IHO identity in determining performance under varying host 
government stances may help to further improve humanitarian operations in a world where 
humanitarian space is shrinking.   
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